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EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF CLEAN AIR
POLICIES: an international and interregional
comparative study!
Peter Knoepfel and Helmut Weidner
1. The concept
1.1 Basic questions
On the basis of a large international comparative study of implemen-
tation policies from 14 different regional implementation systems (RIS)
from the Federal Republic of Germany,2 United Kingdom,3 France,4
Italy5 and the Netherlands,6 we first tried to identify the impact of
regional policies in terms of their capacity to influence the behaviour of
individual emitters within selected local implementation areas (LIA).
For each of the 14 regions we selected two to three LIAs with different
structures of industrial and domestic S02 emitters. We aimed at having
one ofthe three LIAs as a metropolitan area, the second one as a heavily
industrialised area and the third one with a somehow mixed emitters
structure.7 Within each of these local areas we tried to compare changes
over time in the local ambient air quality ('immission' data in the field of
sulphur dioxide - S02)' relating these to the total amount of emission
produced by local emitters. In a second step we tried to find out, by
means of interviews conducted with the main emitters, the different
motives behind observed changes in their behaviour.
One of the most striking results was that, as a whole and
independently of the countries' national programmes, emitter behaviour
was more decisively influenced by such factors as the production situa-
tions of companies, relative price differences on the fuel market, and
energy saving measures undertaken by firms on their own initiative,
than by specific public control measures. In the field of S02 pollution
there is an inseparable relationship between production and emission
volumes, and this is only marginally affected by environmental policy
activities. Thus impacts of environmental quality policies in the field
of air pollution control are much more limited than initially assumed.
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72 Policy and Politics
As we will show in this contribution, there are, however, significant
differences amongst our examined regions which nevertheless can be
attributed to policy activities. Within this paper we would like to stress
these differences in the performance of the regional policies although
keeping in mind that even the most effective policy in our terms
cannot completely explain the whole of changes in emitter behaviours.
Politicians and agencies tend to considerably over-estimate the impact
of their policies.
The common feature of the selected RISs relies on the overall
responsibility of regional or local agencies for the control of the main
emitters within their jurisdiction. There is only one exception to this
which is the case of the two regions selected in Great Britain. Here the
formal programme formation and implementation responsibility lies
with the national Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate (known at the
time of the study as the Alkali Inspectorate). Nevertheless also in the
case of this country we found significantly different interaction networks
within the two selected metropolitan areas (South Yorkshire and
Greater London). These differences justified the identification of at least
informal RISs also in the case of Great Britain.
The most fascinating aspect of the comparison of the impacts of the
selected regional policies was to identify different patterns of the
distribution of regulatory activities amongst the examined LlAs. So we
could find some regions within which regulatory activities were concen-
trated upon one single area whereas in areas equally or even more
polluted regulatory activities were much more limited or even absent.
Given these varying distributional patterns of scarce administrative
resources we decided to concentrate our comparative impact evaluation
also on this distributional aspect. Thus our dependent variable in the
comparison of the regions became both a combination of the efforts and
the relative intensity of regional regulatory activities as a whole as well
as the different patterns of the distribution of regulatory activities
amon~st the different areas compared to what we called 'the problem
pressure' (the extent of the exposed population together with the abso-
lute immission levels). Our comparative question was therefore the
following: which factors coming from inside or from outside of the RISs
TABLEt
Independent variables
national programme
political choices of regional
implementation policies
problem structure
regional regulatory
activity
Dependent variables
overall activity level
overall impacts
impacts in highly polluted
areas
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affect, with what weight, the activity levels, the intensity and the dis-
tribution of regional regulatory activities? On the basis of our empirical
data we could distinguish the following three complexes of independent
variables: the national programme structure, the political choices of
regional implementation policies, and the 'problem structure' (the
actual region-wide distribution of the problem pressure). Table 1 shows
the concept of the inter-RIS comparison.
1.2 Possible characteristics of the dependent variables (performance
level)
As in the case of most international comparisons it does not make much
sense to compare impacts in terms of absolute figures. 8 It is evident that
those figures might be the result of various country-specific factors
which are of no interest for an international comparison. Therefore we
produced, on the basis of all relevant data, statements concerning the
overall regional policy performances. These statements take into
account the following three dimensions:
The overall activity level: this level has been defined by comparing the
number of all emitters of the region with the number of individual
policy out-puts and/or the annual budget (personal, financial means
etc) spent by the agency for the purposes of S02 control. Given the
fact that with the exception of Germany our data do not indicate
significant differences amongst the related averages of the involved
countries, we could base our statements upon a national frame of
reference. This country-specific frame of reference has been finally
selected also for the case of the German RISs because on the one
hand we could find a significant difference between the three regions
(Nordrhein-Westfalen vs Bayern and Berlin) and because on the
other hand the highly formalised German administrative procedures
need more personnel than the more informal ones of the other coun-
tries involved.9 Furthermore we took into consideration the equity of
the distribution of the outputs with regard to the distribution of the
problem pressure within the region. A high overall activity level was
attributed to those regions where the number of outputs and/or the
agencies' budgets were relatively high (mainly compared to the other
RISs of the same country) and where most or all of the problematic
areas were affected by regulatory activities.
Overall impacts: this dimension was determined on the basis of
our interviews with the main emitters in the local implementation
areas. Again we took into consideration the spatial distribution of
the impact: regions were only characterised as having high over-
all impacts where we could observe a relatively high impact of
regulatory activities in all three selected LIAs. Again the main frame
of reference consisted of the national context; this turned out to
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74 Policy and Politics
be more reliable than the largely uncontrollable cross-national
comparisons of simple facts stemming from very different regulatory
traditions of the countries under comparison.
Impacts in highly polluted and densely populated areas: as already
mentioned, we could find regions where in the most polluted metro-
politan areas the impacts of regulatory activities were high whereas
for instance in industrial pools we could only barely observe visible
effects. Using this criterion we introduced a particularly immission-
oriented evaluation dimension. This choice turned out to be
necessary because of the predominantly immission-orientation of the
national programmes of all of the included countries. According to
this orientation clean air regulation is considered as a means to
control local ambient air quality trends mainly in the surroundings of
air pollution sources. The objective of such policies is in fact achieved
whenever local concentrations of S02 (and not of H2S04 eg) can be
kept below a certain immission level. This policy concept only calls
for a limitation of emissions when local air quality is affected. High
chimney policies are therefore one of the most recognised and most
visible consequences of these concepts. In the seventies no national
programme of the included countries provided a systematic control
of the total amount of the emissions of the country. We all know that
from the point of view of the eighties (dying forests, trans-boundary
air pollution, acid rain) an emission-orientation seems to be the only
reasonable concept for an actually preventive air quality control
policy. We are convinced, however, that any serious implementation
evaluation of the policies of the seventies must take as its frame of
reference the explicit policy intentions and not the point of view
of the researcher. It is, nevertheless, also true that no national pro-
gramme explicitly limited air quality regulations to highly polluted
areas. Furthermore any immission-orientation by definition implies
the mandate to observe and to control air quality trends in less
urbanized rural areas ('non deterioration clauses'). Thus, even a
successful concentration of regulatory activities on metropolitan
areas, leaving apart the other areas, must be considered as a halfway
victory even under an immission-oriented policy concept. Therefore
we had to take care of the already mentioned overall impact within
the whole region.
By combining these three dimensions (1: overall activity level; 2:
overall impact; 3: impact in highly polluted areas) we developed the
following eight types of performance levels:
1: 1-,2+,3+
2: 1+,2+,3+
3: 1-,2-,3+
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4: ]+, 2-, 3+
5: ] -, 2+, 3-
6: ]+,2+,3-
7: ] -, 2-, 3-
8: ]+,2-,3-
75
The proposed scale ranging from I to 8 corresponds with a decreas-
ing performance level. This range takes account of the relation between
costs and benefits, because the patterns with the even numbers reflect
high activity and the odd numbers low activity, and administrative costs
are a function of activity level.
High effects with visible improvements
(including highly polluted areas)
low administrative costs:
high administrative costs:
in all areas of the region
type]
type 2
2 Visible improvements in the highly polluted and densely populated
areas within the region
low administrative costs: type 3
high administrative costs: type 4
3 Diffuse effects in all the region which, however,
significant improvement in the polluted areas
with low administrative costs:
with high administrative costs:
4 Regulation without any significant impacts
with high administrative costs:
with low administrative costs:
do not lead to
type 5
type 6
type 7
type 8
] .3 The independent variables
Our results permitted us to reduce the complexity in the field of our
three selected independent variables (programme structure, political
choices of regional implementation policies, and problem structure) in
the sense that we could in fact reduce them to two for each case: the mix
of variables which turned out to mainly explain the differences between
the selected RISs either consist of a combination between the variables
'political choices of regional implementation policies' and the specific
'programme structure' or between 'political choices of implementation
policies' and the 'problem structure'. This reduction in the number of
variables highlights the most significant elements of policy even if it may
partly underestimate the weight of the eliminated variable. In this sense
it must be remembered that even in the case of those regions where the
national programme did not significantly shape the implementation
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76 Policy and Politics
policies, the fact of its existence will undoubtedly have had a certain
influence on the regional agencies.
The different variables can be characterised as follows:
The national programme structure: its explanatory capacity is high
where most of the substantive, procedural and organisational ele-
ments of these programmes as well as their specific linkages are
reflected within the regional policy. By definition this is only poss-
ible in the cases where national programmes contain relatively
concrete elements (as in Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands). 10
Problem structure: the explanatory capacity of this variable is high
where the arrangements of outputs and their impacts can be inter-
preted as an immediate reflection of the problem pressure within the
region. Both the spatial distribution and the intensity of regulatory
activities in such cases can be mainly explained by the problem
structure itself; the programme structure or specific political policy
choices are of limited importance for the explanation of such policy
effects. A good example is the case of the Paris region (lie de France):
here our data show that policy implementation activities are dis-
tributed almost in complete compliance with the trends showed by
data as produced by the S02 measurement network. It must be
stressed that this considerable correspondence is achieved due to the
use of collective rather than individual outputs, committing a whole
range of emitters within a certain area to emission reductions (special
protection areas coupled with 'alarm networks' which automatically
'order' changes in fuels in critical periods).
Political choices of regional implementation agencies: if the implemen-
tation results neither reflect the observed problem-structure nor can
be reasonably explained by specific priorities already set within the
national programme, this third variable complex becomes important.
We were in fact able to find regional policies where the main
explanation was specific (mainly political) policy decisions, setting
particular priorities for the region. These priorities not infrequently
turned out to be even in opposition with the national programme and
moreover inconsistent with the given problem pressure distribution.
The main representative of this type could be found in those situa-
tions where the regional implementation policy seemed to be an
immediate reflection of political pressure calling for or effectively
preventing regional regulatory activities within the concerned
localities.
Table 2 shows the different possibilities of combining characteristics
of the selected independent variables:
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TABLE 2
77
A: National programme high middle low
B: Political choices of regional high middle low
implementation policies regional regulatory
activities
B: Political choices of regional high middle low
implementation policies
C: Problem structure high middle low
Before presenting the results of our study we should stress the fact
that, against our initial hypothesis, one of the most frequently dis-
cussedll variables turned out to be of very limited importance: the
degree of formalised access of the public to the policy implementation
processes. We could not find significant differences in the contents of
outputs between those countries which, by means of their procedural
laws, guarantee a formalised participation of the public (the Federal
Republic of Germany, France and the Netherlands) and those countries
where the procedural arrangements must be characterised as relatively
closed (Italy and Great Britain). The possibilities of influencing choices
of regional implementation policies (against or in correspondence with
the problem pressure) seem to depend much more on possibilities and
capabilities of local governments to mobilise regional resources, or
alternatively, to block the regional attempts to effectively control
local emitters. This observation at least partly has to do with the
fact that such policy decisions consist of general priority setting
and planning decisions rather than individual clean up orders or
permits. Formalised public participation is normally guaranteed within
individual procedures.
Again, contrary to our initial assumption, the administrative and
technical capacity of the regional agencies as such turned out to be of a
very limited importance. Varying administrative capacities within one
and the same country affected the activity and, more especially, the
impact of the agency policies much less than we assumed. Such varia-
tions only lead to significant differences in the impacts when the cor-
responding interaction networks with local governments were equally
developed. It seems that regional administrative and technical capacities
can only be fruitfully used if interactions with local government are
intensive and more or less in harmony.
2. The different performance levels of the 14 regional implementation
systems
Table 3 shows the different performance levels (ranging from I:
high performance, to 8: low performance, according to the typology
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TABLE 3
FRG
Berlin 7
Bayern 7
NRW8
England
London 2
South
Yorkshire 7
France
lie de France 1
Nord-Pas de
Calais 4
Provence-Cote
d'Azur6
Italy
Lombardie 2
Emilia
Romagna 6
Piemont 7
Netherlands
Nord-Holland 3
Sud-Holland 4
Gelderland 7
Total 22
Average 7·3
Rank 5
9
4·5
2
11
3·7
I
TABLE 4
15
5
4
14
4·7
3
Group Type
Regional Implementation
Systems (: types)
high performance overall
2 high performance in polluted areas
within the region
3 low performance
4 without effects
2 London (2)
Lombardie (2)
lie de France (I)
3 4 Nord-Holland (3)
Sud-Holland (4)
Nord-Pas de Calais (4)
5 6 Emilia Romagna (6)
Provence-Cote d'Azur (6)
7 8 Berlin (7)
Bayern (7)
Nordrhein-Westfalen (8)
South Yorkshire (7)
Gelderland (7)
Piemont (7)
presented above) of the 14 regional implementation systems for the five
countries included in our research. The ranking position is calculated by
means of a simple addition of the positions of the individual regional
systems indicated by the type-number we have attributed to these
systems. The lower the total for a country, the better the country ranks
in the comparison.
These results suggest the following comments:
With the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
we can observe significant differences between the performance
levels within one and the same country. On the other hand we can
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Knoepfel and Weidner: Performance of clean air policies 79
find similar performance levels in a cross-national inter-regional
comparison.
For several observers at least the two extreme positions will not be
surprising: the first place of the French implementation systems will
not surprise those scholars familiar with comparative policy analysis.
Studies of other policy areas (industrial development, 12 telecommuni-
cations,13 public transportl4) have indicated evidence of effective
implementation, which is attributed to the high professionalisation of
French policies ('Ies corps'), strong vertical interaction-networks
amongst the individual policies, and the high 'technicity' of French
policies with their concomitant 'campaign character'. On the other
hand there are several reports which show the relatively low
performance of German public policies (in the field of labour market
policiesls or environmental policiesl6 as a whole). As in our case,
this low performance has to do with the structure of national pro-
grammes. 17 It is surprising that Italy is not ranked last; furthermore
one of its three regions even ranks amongst the best performers. As
we will see, this exceptional position of the region of Lombardy is due
to the low degree of politicisation of its regIonal policy as well as to
the relatively developed technical and managerial capacity of the
regional agency.
Last, but not least, we must stress the fact that both our observations
within the investigated regions and our comparative evaluative state-
ments might be incomplete. Therefore the established ranking order
for the included countries might be problematic and even dangerous.
As we will show in the following, our research actually is much more
interested in the cross-national regional comparison and especially in
the attempt to compare the patterns of explanatory variables for dif-
ferent performance degrees than in the comparison of the countries
as such.IS
Table 4 ranges the 14 regional implementation systems according to
the four main performance leve!s from 1 (= high performance) to
4( = without significant effects).
It is interesting to notice that the three high performing regions come
from three countries which are extremely different with regard to their
general constitutional, political and economic conditions. The three
regions, however, each represent one of the most important economic
and political metropolitan areas of their respective country. The fact
that two of the three Dutch regions ranked in the second class which,
according to our typology, is characterised by a concentration on highly
polluted areas, shows the still predominant immission-orientation of the
Dutch clean air policy, in contrast to the official national government's
declarations. According to official statements by the Dutch Government
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a 
to
: U
ni
ve
rs
ite
 d
e 
La
us
an
ne
IP
 : 
13
0.
22
3.
2.
13
6 
O
n:
 W
ed
, 2
9 
O
ct
 2
01
4 
14
:4
6:
59
Co
py
rig
ht
  T
he
 P
ol
icy
 P
re
ss
80 Policy and Politics
and to central policy goals established in governmental air poIlution
abatement programmes, the main objectives are to prevent a deterior-
ation of ambient air quality in general (non-deterioration clause) and to
achieve a total national S02 emission load of no more than 500 kt/a. 19
The same tendency also seems to be true for the Nord-Pas de Calais of
France (the lie de France is also a region where there is this strong
immission-orientation; the reason it is in the first local group is that
more or less the whole policy-relevant territory can be considered as a
highly poIluted and densely populated area). Four of the five countries
are represented by at least one of their regions within the group of the
mostly ineffective implementation policies. This last group contains six
of the 14 regions. Furthermore it is interesting to notice that all three
German regions are in this last group.
3. Cross-national comparison of the independent variables
3.1 In high performing implementation systems
Table 5 shows the explanatory capacity of the three independent vari-
ables for the three highest performing regional implementation systems:
TABLE 5
Variables
National programme
Political choices
Problem structure
London
middle
middle
Lombardy
low
high
I/e de France
low
high
This table tells its own tale: what strikes one is the almost complete
absence of any significant role of the national programme for all three
implementation policies in spite of their different structure. Both the
British and the French programme, which are characterised by a very
vague, incomplete (absence of concrete ambient air quality standards
and general abatement equipment standards) and mainly organisational
set of rules (eg the British Clean Air Acts) and the extremely detailed
Italian programme (immission and emission standards etc) did not
actuaIly guide regional implementation activities. On the other hand,
we observed in all three regions the explanatory importance of the
dimension 'problem structure'. Regional implementation priorities as
weIl as the content of individual outputs were significantly shaped by
the actual poIlution at the beginning of regulatory activities, by the
observed pollution situation at the beginning of regulatory activities, by
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Knoepfel and Weidner: Performance of clean air policies 81
the observed pollution trends within most of the local areas of the
region and by the technical regulation requirements of the different
groups of sources to be controlled. Correspondingly we found little
evidence of explicit political policy choices concerning regulatory activi-
ties. In all three cases well staffed agencies seem to have succeeded in
conceiving their regulatory activities in compliance with the varying
problem pressure within the controlled areas. Notice that in all three
agencies had to deal with political pressure coming from one or more
local areas but were strong enough to use this pressure in order to
identify problematic activities without becoming dependent on it. The
agencies could maintain their independence by partly managing and
dominating the network within which they had to act. One of the most
important conditions for this success was the strong position of the
agencies within this network but also their capability to use the pressure
for their own purposes: namely the setting of priorities completely
according to technically-perceived problem structures. One of our best
examples is the policy of the Lombardian air pollution control agency
(CRIAL) which explicitly set problem oriented priorities (extension of
the monitoring network within the problematic areas of the province
of Milan and concentration of regulatory activities upon emitters out of
these areas following a schedule 'branche per branche'). These often had
to be implemented by postponing individual municipalities' requests for
further regulations. By this means the agency could achieve a relatively
equal distribution of its regulatory resources which also took care of the
pollution risk of those parts of the population living in municipalities,
the political weight of which was not sufficient to mobilise regional
interventions.20
3.2 In regions where high performance was present in high polluted areas
Table 6 shows the explanatory capacity of the independent variables for
those regional implementation policies which rank in the second group:
TABLE 6
Variables North·Holland
National programme middle
Political choices middle
Problem structure
South-Holland Nord·Pas de Calais
middle
high high
low
The concentration on the most critical areas to the disadvantage of
smaller industrial zones or rural areas seems to reflect, in all of the
three regions, a corresponding political pressure articulated by the local
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governments of the major urban areas. It becomes evident that the
explanatory capacity of the problem structure is much more limited
than for group I. This becomes evident if one considers the increasing
pollution trends outside the metropolitan areas which, according to
the immission-oriented air pollution control concept laid down in the
legislation of both France and the Netherlands would have called for
further regional implementation activities. We can observe therefore a
partial discrepancy between the distribution of the problem pressure
and the distribution of the regulatory activities within the region.
This group is particularly interesting for those scholars interested in
distributive effects of regulatory policies.
3.3 In low performing regions
Table 7 shows the explanatory capacity of the two relatively low
performing regional implementation systems, Emilia-Romagna and
Provence-Cote d'Azur:
TABLE 7
Variables
National programme
Political choices
Problem structure
Emilia Romagna
middle
middle
Provence-Cote d'Azur
middle
middle
It is difficult to interpret this table. However, we can stress the fact
that these two policies within the period of investigation have to be
characterised as typical transitional policies. Within their countries they
underwent a remarkable change from an immission-oriented towards
an emission-oriented clean air policy. This change involved a concen-
tration on a selected set of industrial activities within specific plants
which were cleaned up independently of their location within or out-
side highly polluted metropolitan areas. The selection of these plants
(Emilia Romagna: iron and steel works; Fos Etang de Berre Martigues
within Provence-Cote d'Azur: new large-scale industrial plants) was
influenced by political pressure working in both a positive and negative
sense. This group is therefore interesting for those scholars mainly
studying conditions for such a change in clean air policies. The increas-
ing concern with the issue of acid rain, with its impact upon the forests
of central and northern Europe, indicated a need for a change in policy
emphasis of this kind, focusing attention upon emission rather than
merely upon local ambient air quality (immission).
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Knoepfel and Weidner: Performance of clean air policies 83
3.4 In regions where implementation had no significant impact
Table 8 shows the explanatory capacity of the independent variables of
the six regional implementation systems which belong to the last group
comprising implementation policies with almost no actual impacts.
TABLE 8
Variables Berlin Bayern NRW South Yorkshire Gelderland Piemont
National
programme high middle high middle low
Political
choices low middle middle middle low high
Problem
structure high
This table shows in general the inverse picture of Table 5 above
concerning the most performant systems. This is especially true as far as
the low explanatory capacity of the variable 'problem structure' is con-
cerned. The only exception is South Yorkshire. Here, compared to the
RIS London, the influence of the problem structure must be rated high
because regulatory activities have been decisively influenced by the
specific problem situation (strong position of the coal mining industry,
unfavourable economic situation). Thus, with a certain exception of the
LIA Sheffield due to its rather effective Smoke Control Programme
(domestic heating), industrial emission sources (and in the case of the
LIA Barnsley also domestic sources) have been treated in a way which
clearly reflects the prevailing problem structure (minor enforcement
activities, especially concerning old industrial emission sources).21
Less significant but still evident is the high explanatory capacity of
the programme structures. In the reports on regulatory activities in
these regions we found many observations pointing out the constraining
role of the national programme (for example legal clauses concerning
the 'economic and technical feasibility' used by emitters as a successful
weapon against regional agencies; or the legal provision that every
emitter should be regulated (FRG); or the formal clean up procedure in
the Italian legislation). Not infrequently we also found programme-
related regulatory priorities which turned out to be far from the actual
regulatory needs. Such priorities often led to inefficient outputs. In
the case of the region of Piedmont the application of the national
programme by the legalistic regional agency actually hampered the
development of an adequate technical control rationality. This also held
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true for the three German regions investigated. The German air pollu-
tion control programme as established by laws and regulations of the
national and state governments is a highly complex one because almost
every minor aspect of enforcement activities is covered by formal, very
detailed regulations and directives to be observed by the responsible
(implementation) authorities. Yet, on the other hand, the legal pro-
visions have not led to the establishment of obligatory control require-
ments: there is a lack of clear and binding objectives as well as effective
administrative instruments directed to the control of major emitting
TABLE 9
Level of performance
National
Programme
-high
-middle
-low
High in
High performance polluted areas
Nord-Holland (3),
Sud-Holland (4)
Low Without effects
Berlin (7), Nord-
rehein-Westfalen
(8)
Bayern (7),
Gelderland (7)
Piemont (7)
- middle London (2)
Political
choices
-high
-low Lombardie (2),
lie de France (I)
Nord-Pas de Piemont (7)
Calais (4),
Sud-Holland (4)
Nord-Holland (3) Emilia Gelderland (7),
Romagna (6) NRW (7), South
Provence-Cote Yorkshire (7)
d'Azur (6)
Berlin (7)
Problem
structure
- high Lombardie (2),
lie de France (I)
- middle London (2)
-low
South Yorkshire
(7)
Emilia
Romagna (6)
Provence-Cote
d'Azur (6)
Nord-Pas de
Calais (4)
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sources. Thus, to give just one example, the formal requirements have
brought about rather sophisticated regional Clean Air Plans which were
highly cost-intensive and required large numbers of staff. However, they
soon turned out to be quite ineffective because the law did not provide
for specific means to enforce these plans. Instead of eliminating this
obvious shortcoming with the help of new, enforcement-oriented legal
provisions, another development occurred: the tremendous increase
in regulations with more detailed requirements concerning specific
elements of the Clean Air Plans (eg emission inventory, monitoring
requirements).
In general, the highly formalised German control system with its
emphasis on secondary aspects and neglect of the core issues not only
reduces the flexibility and latitude of the responsible authorities but also
increases administrative costs and - owing to the limited budget-
also swallows up resources badly needed for effective measures (eg
supervision). All in all, the predominance of very detailed, formal
regulations fits the political-administrative culture of this country and
supports the attitude of public administration which is altogether in
favour of legalistic approaches.22
4. Conclusions: comparison of the explanatory patterns of the 14
regional implementation systems
Table 9 shows the influence of the three independent variables on the
performance level of the regional implementation systems studied.
A highly programme-controlled clean air policy seems to have
negatively influenced the performance level of regional implementation
activities in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany but also, to a
lesser extent, of Italy. In the latter case the relative success of the region
of Lombardy has actually to be attributed to the fact that the regional
implementation policy has been developed partly against the national
programme. Highly programme-controlled clean air policies seem to be
less problematic in the case of the two Dutch regions North-Holland
and South-Holland (as well as in the case of two Swiss regional
implementation23 systems studied but not included in this report). On
the contrary all three regions of the apparently 'optimal' case of France
turned out to be much less programme-controlled than others.
One could argue that the extent to which public policies are
programme-controlled is rather more dependent on the overall national
political-administrative culture than on policy-specific features.24 So we
can find multiple public policies in the FRG as well as in Italy sharing
the characteristic of being over-controlled by highly detailed pro-
grammes. This situation often hampers the development of adequate
implementation policies on the regional and local level. Also, French
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a 
to
: U
ni
ve
rs
ite
 d
e 
La
us
an
ne
IP
 : 
13
0.
22
3.
2.
13
6 
O
n:
 W
ed
, 2
9 
O
ct
 2
01
4 
14
:4
6:
59
Co
py
rig
ht
  T
he
 P
ol
icy
 P
re
ss
86 Policy and Politics
public policies often share common features: national programmes are
often formulated in vague terms leaving a lot of discretion to regional or
departmental implementation agencies which, in turn, are often both
managerially and technically well staffed. Swiss and Dutch policies
again seem to share relatively detailed programmes which anticipate a
decision on those conflicts which in other countries normally arise only
in the implementation phase. Therefore we can find more conflictual
programme formation processes and less controversies in related
implementation activities.
In spite of such cultural-specific explanations we can learn from our
study that, independently of these political-administrative environ-
ments, clean air policies tend to be more successful if they leave to the
regional implementation agencies a considerable leeway of political and
administrative or technical discretion. This necessity stems from the
nature of clean air policies themselves which have to control extremely
different problem constellations. Furthermore such policies need a large
consensus amongst local target groups which cannot be anticipated by
detailed but still general national programmes.
Politically controlled regional implementation activities should not
be automatically assumed to be low performers. Much depends on the
position of the regional implementation agency within the regional
policy network, and whether it is strong enough to countervail local
political pressure likely to privilege selected areas to the disadvantage
of others. However we also found politically controlled misallocation
of implementation resources to the advantage of less polluted areas
in the two regional implementation systems of Emilia Romagna and
Provence-Cote d'Azur.25
If combined with the characteristics of programme-controlled
policies, explicit political regional implementation policies, however,
seem to be condemned to ineffectiveness: in the case of the region of
Piemont the political control over the regional implementation policy
was able to mobilise all elements of the national programme in a way
which could check or even block regulatory activities, to the advantage
of the most important emitters of the city of Turin.26 Those agencies,
however, which conceived their implementation policies mainly accord-
ing to problem pressure data either by following a more technocratic
concept (Ile de France and Provence-Cotes d'Azur) or a more
participatory approach (intensive cooperation with local governments
as in the case of the region of Lombardy) turned out to be most
successful. In both cases implementation could profit from the absence
of a significant deviating political control articulated through local
governments' pressure as well as from the strong technical staff of the
regional agency and its predominant role in the regional network. One
should stress, however, that political pressure in the case of the region of
Lombardy was not absent as such, but that the agency was successful in
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canalising this pressure in a positive way. The same held true for the
more informal regional implementation system of London, where both
the Greater London Council and some local governments were able to
mobilise political pressure in order to support locally (domestic heating
control) and nationally (industrial air pollution control) determined
policies.
5. Recommendations
On the basis of the results we have reported here in a very concentrated
way, we have tried to formulate some recommendations for future
modifications of clean air policies. These recommendations are presented
in separate publications which did not only take care of comparative
aspects but made an attempt to contribute further to different national
policy debates according to the individual conditions of these coun-
tries.27 Given the problem of long range air pollution, leading to
the well known phenomenon of acid rains and dying forests, we
recommended first of all a radical reorientation of the objectives of all
policies. The recommended changes from immission towards emission-
oriented clean air policies require drastic measures in the field of techno-
logical innovation concerning all combustion activities, independently
of their location in more or less polluted areas. This reorientation
concomitantly should lead to a certain shift of the burden of implemen-
tation within the regional agencies in the form of standardised national
requirements for smaller plants as well as for large scale combustion
facilities (such as power plants and different types of refineries). Accord-
ing to all our results it will still be important to limit these standards
to a set of minimal requirements; regional agencies should have the
possibility of fixing further technical conditions as well as branch-wide
and/or locally different timetables for compliance. Given such guide-
lines for these to specific emitter groups, regional agencies will have
resources enough to start clean-up activities in the large field of middle
sized plants where at least in the immediate future they need consider-
able leeway of discretion. In order to exclude time consuming court suits
about the extent of this discretionary power, parliamentary acts should
explicitly clarify the legal leeway of regional implementation policies.
Given the fact that the French regional implementation systems
turned out to be the most successful ones our recommendations are
mainly based upon the following characteristics of these systems:
-a relatively subtle structure of the national programme, leaving
important discretion to regional agencies;
-an adequate technical and managerial staffing of regional agencies;
-the capability of these agencies to defend their independent positions
within the region-wide interaction network, as well as managerial
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capacity to use local political pressure for the purpose of a problem-
oriented setting of priorities;
-the existence of collective outputs oriented towards a whole group of
emitters ('alarm networks' and 'special protection zones') the appli-
cation of which is based upon contractual procedures including the
main interest groups (local governments, industrial associations,
regional agencies and environmental protection groups).
Nevertheless, we share the common scepticism with regard to any
simple policy transfer proposition. As pointed out above, important ele-
ments of the French approach are rooted in the overall French political
administrative culture and their transfer to another country risks failure
because these conditions do not exist in the new country. Two illus-
trations of this are: the strongly organised 'corps' mainly responsible for
French clean air policies, and the relatively low priority given to equity
within the French political culture allowing, amongst others, a relatively
high degree of flexibility in decisions on individual outputs.
It would be outside the scope of this presentation to discuss each of
these recommendations. Nevertheless, we would like to emphasise that
for the development of an internationally co-ordinated environmental
policy national and regional features and preconditions of air pollution
control policies must be given due consideration. As yet international
policies have neglected the importance of regional aspects to an even
greater extent than national policies. Especially when it comes to
'programming the programme', regional features - as we tried to
demonstrate in this article - may have a great influence on the actual
achievements of general pollution control programmes. 28
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policy neglecting the basic national and regional features and their influence on
implementational achievements is the EEC directive on ambient air quality stan-
dards for S02 and particulates of 1980. We have tried to draw attention to these
shortcomings in an ex ante assessment shortly after the directive was enacted:
H. Weidner and P. Knoepfel, 'Implementationschancen der EG-Richtlinie zue
S02-Luftreinhaltepolitik. Ein kritischer Beitrag zur Internationalisierung von
Umweltpolitik', Zeitschrift fur Umweltpolitik, Vol 4, No. I, March 1981, pp
27-67.
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